Duhem specifically states that the

The Duhems made sure that Pierre was well educated. Starting at theage of seven he was given private lessons with a small group ofstudents, on grammar, arithmetic, Latin, and catechism. A letter hewrote about the siege of Chateaudun he experienced in October 1870attests to his being already a literate writer by the age of nine. Theyoung Duhem was witness to some troubling times, with theFranco-Prussian War raging until the armistice in February 1871 and theParis Commune in March. The Duhems had avoided the advance of thePrussians against Paris but were caught up in the siege of Chateaudun;they barely escaped to Bordeaux, returning to Paris after the armisticeand just before the Paris Commune. That social experiment lasted onlytwo months, though it set the stage for some wide-rangingtransformations to French culture that were to have great consequenceswhen they were later established permanently. Among the Commune'sdecrees were the separation of church from state, the rendering of allchurch property into public property, and the exclusion of religionfrom schools. The Duhems did not approve of these measures and wereparticularly chagrined by some of the extreme actions taken by the mostradical elements of the Commune, such as the desecration of churchesand graveyards. For the Duhems, the Commune was a paradigm of anarchyand irreligion.

There is no such thing as the Duhem-Quine Thesis.

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A First Look: Duhem, Quine, and the Problems of Underdetermination.

That was a time in the 1990s when I backed off from the “champion of Popper” stance and took on a Masters in History and Philosophy of Science to find out what it was like to approach the field like a novice, with a relatively open mind.

Duhem pointed out that the outcome .On Duhem's and Quine's Theses.

It was hard to find a thesis topic, I really wanted to work on objective knowledge or metaphysical research programs but there was nobody who could supervise those topics so I had to settle for something that a member of staff could handle. Alan was the best of a small bunch, the other two were social constructivists and he suggested the Duhem problem which turned out to be a nice pick although he had to practically push me over the line to get the work done. He was a fine supervisor.

The justification Duhem gives for the accusation of extreme boldness isthat:
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P hilosophy of science Also called the Quine–Duhem thesis

A popular criticism of Karl Popper is that his criterion of falsifiability runs aground on the Duhem-Quine thesis. That is, for any putative falsification, it’s always possible to preserve a scientific hypothesis by revising auxiliary hypotheses in its stead. For example, in September 2011, a team of CERN physicists recorded neutrinos traveling 0.002 percent faster than the speed of light. Journalists notwithstanding, this observation wasn’t readily accepted as falsifying the theory of relativity. Scientists, including the CERN team, merely presumed something else was responsible for the anomaly. Subsequent experiments were unable to replicate the same outcome, and the original results were later explained by a loose fiber-optic cable. The observation of neutrinos traveling faster than the speed of light never happened; the apparent falsification was predicated upon all the cables being screwed tight. A scientific hypothesis, then, is never tested in isolation but among a web of auxiliary hypotheses, varying from the mundane to the metaphysical. It’s impossible, says the critic, to actually falsify scientific hypotheses, because, for any putative falsification, it’s logically possible that an auxiliary hypothesis is to blame instead. Therefore, Popper’s criterion of falsifiability fails to solve the problem of demarcation; scientific hypotheses are only falsifiable insofar as we arbitrarily choose to falsify them instead of auxiliary hypotheses.

Philosophy of Science: Duhem-Quine Thesis - YouTube

As presented so far, Duhem is a philosopher who weaves together twolarge patchworks of theses: (i) instrumentalism or fictionalism,anti-atomism or anti-Cartesianism, anti-modelism, and autonomy ofphysics from metaphysics and (ii) anti-inductivism or critique ofNewtonian method, the Duhem thesis, that is, non-falsifiability andnon-separability. Both sets of theses are intended as empirical thesesabout the workings of science and both are important to understandingDuhem's thought. The first set of theses effectively demarcatesphysical theory as an autonomous domain apart from other domains, thatis, rejects any external method, and the second set then operates onthe internal workings of physical theory. Having set apart physicaltheory, Duhem asserts that no internal method leads inexorably to thetruth.

Underdetermination Thesis, Duhem-Quine Thesis - …

Van Fraassen is widely (though mistakenly) regarded as holding thatthe prospect of contrastive underdetermination grounded in suchempirical equivalents demands that we restrict our epistemic ambitionsfor the scientific enterprise itself. His constructive empiricismholds that the aim of science is not to find true theories, but onlytheories that are empirically adequate: that is, theories whose claimsabout observable phenomena are all true. Since the empiricaladequacy of a theory is not threatened by the existence of anotherthat is empirically equivalent to it, fulfilling this aim has nothingto fear from the possibility of such empirical equivalents. In reply,many critics have suggested that van Fraassen gives no reasons forrestricting belief to empirical adequacy that could not also be usedto argue for suspending our belief in the future empiricaladequacy of our best present theories: of course there couldbe empirical equivalents to our best theories, but there could also betheories equally well-supported by all the evidence up to the presentwhich diverge in their predictions about observables in future casesnot yet tested. This challenge seems to miss the point of VanFraassen’s epistemic voluntarism: his claim is that we shouldbelieve no more but also no less than we need to make senseof and take full advantage of our scientific theories, and acommitment to the empirical adequacy of our theories, he suggests, isthe least we can get away with in this regard. Of course it is truethat we are running some epistemic risk in believing in even the fullempirical adequacy of our present theories, but the risk isconsiderably less than what we assume in believing in their truth, itis the minimum we need to take full advantage of the fruits of ourscientific labors, and, he famously suggests, “it is not anepistemic principle that one might as well hang for a sheep as alamb” (1980, 72).