Writing a Hypothesis for Your Science Fair Project
Geology Songs: Educational Songs for Teaching Earth Science
This question of trustworthiness can be broken down into sub-questions: (a) do the equations of the model represent the target system accurately enough for the purpose at hand and (b) does the computer provide accurate enough solutions of these equations. Practicioners refer to these, respectively, as the problem of validation and the problem of verification. In practice we often face a version of the Duhem problem because one can only evaluate the "net outcome" of a simulation and it is not possible to address these two issues one by one. This had led scientists to develop various methods to test whether the outcome of simulation is on target; for a discussion of these see Winsberg (2009, 2010).
Language Learning and Teaching: Krashen's Input Hypothesis
It has been claimed that computer simulations constitute a genuinelynew methodology of science or even a new scientific paradigm, which, moreover also raise a new host of philosophical issues (Humphreys2004, 2009, Rohrlich 1991, Winsberg 2001 and 2003, and various contributionsto Sismondo and Gissis 1999). Hence the claim is that simulations call into question our philosophical understanding of many aspects of science. However, this enthusiasm is not shared universally and some argue that simulations, far from demanding a new philosophy of science, raise few if any new philosophical problems (Frigg and Reiss 2009).
and making and testing an experimental hypothesis, which is science
The drawback of this suggestion is that fictional entities arenotoriously beset with ontological riddles. This has led manyphilosophers to argue that there are no such things as fictionalentities and that apparent ontological commitments to them must berenounced. The most influential of these deflationary accounts goesback to Quine (1953). Building on Russell's discussion ofdefinite descriptions, Quine argues that it is an illusion that werefer to fictional entities when we talk about them. Instead, we candispose of these alleged objects by turning the terms that refer tothem into predicates and analyse sentences like ‘Pegasus doesnot exist’ as ‘nothing pegasizes’. By eliminatingthe troublesome term we eschew the ontological commitment they seem tocarry. This has resulted in a lack of interest in fictional entities,in particular among philosophers of science. In a programmatic essay Fine (1993) draws attention to this neglect and submits that Quinean skepticism notwithstanding fictions play an important role in scientific reasoning. However, Fine does not offera systematic account of fictions and of how they are put to use inscience.