Anderson relates to the "reductionist" hypothesis

Reductionism is the hypothesis that science is unified by chains of intertheoretic reductions across disciplines, with theories from basic physics providing the ultimate ground. The classic work on intertheoretic reduction in the philosophy of science is chapter 11 of Ernest Nagel’s The Structure of Science. For Nagel, reduction is logical deduction (derivation) of the statements of the reduced theory TR from those of the reducing theory TB. In interesting cases from science’s history, the 7Rs contain terms that do not occur within the descriptive vocabulary of TB (e.g., equilibrium thermodynamics contains "pressure" and "temperature," which do not occur in statistical mechanics and the kinetic/corpuscular theory of matter). Such cases are especially prominent in the psychological and social sciences because their theories developed mostly independently of one another. To derive such 7Rs from Tg in something other than a trivial fashion, Nagel insisted that the premises of the derivation require bridge principles connecting terms across the theories (e.g., "temperature in a gas is mean kinetic energy of molecular constituents"). Furthermore, most historical scientific reductions are corrective—they indicate where the TR is false. Thus Nagel insisted that the premises of the deduction must contain not only the TB and the necessary bridge principles but also various limiting assumptions and boundary conditions on T^s application, some of which are contrary to fact. These elements circumscribe the falsity in the premises of the valid derivation of a false conclusion (TR) away from the (presumed true) TB. Challenges to Nagel’s account were quickly raised by philosophers of science, but virtually every alternative account of intertheoretic reduction—for example those by Kenneth F. Schaffner in 1967 and Clifford Hooker in 1981—emerged as a direct response to Nagel’s details.

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A Reductionist Approach to Hypothesis-Catching for …

In a reductionist framework, ..

N2 - This chapter aims to correct two common and related misconceptions in discussions of the epistemology of testimony. The first misconception is that testimonial knowledge is an epistemically distinct kind of knowledge only if there are testimony-specific epistemic principles implicated in the justification of beliefs formed through testimony. The second misconception is that anyone who endorses a reductionist position regarding the epistemic status of testimony, and so denies the existence of testimony-specific epistemic principles, ipso facto ought to be hostile to the hypothesis that testimonial knowledge is epistemically distinctive. The chapter argues against both misconceptions by arguing for the distinctiveness hypothesis in a way that involves no premise any reductionist should want to deny.

Reductionism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

This chapter aims to correct two common and related misconceptions in discussions of the epistemology of testimony. The first misconception is that testimonial knowledge is an epistemically distinct kind of knowledge only if there are testimony-specific epistemic principles implicated in the justification of beliefs formed through testimony. The second misconception is that anyone who endorses a reductionist position regarding the epistemic status of testimony, and so denies the existence of testimony-specific epistemic principles, ipso facto ought to be hostile to the hypothesis that testimonial knowledge is epistemically distinctive. The chapter argues against both misconceptions by arguing for the distinctiveness hypothesis in a way that involves no premise any reductionist should want to deny.

have been purged from science and as so, the reductionist hypothesis (sometimes called the
A Reductionist Approach to Hypothesis-Catching for the Analysis of Self-Organizing Decision-Making Systems - 7th IEEE Int

Reductionism - SAGE Research Methods

Gaia has had little effect on research agendas, however, and the number of working scientists willing to be associated with the hypothesis is small—perhaps less than a dozen. Critique of the hypothesis focuses on three lines of argument. Gaia is said to be tautological because it asserts that life exists under exactly those conditions that are suitable for life. It is said to be teleological because it implies that the earth system must have evolved according to a design concept. And it is said to be trivial because, even so, Gaia adds little to existing knowledge about feedbacks among physical, chemical, and biological processes (Kirchner 2002). In response it is argued that Gaia is an emergent phenomenon that cannot be understood through traditional, disciplinary, and reductionist cause-and-effect reasoning. Lynn Margulis, a forceful advocate of Gaia, suggests: "The Gaian viewpoint is not popular because so many scientists, wishing to continue business as usual, are loath to venture outside of their respective disciplines. At least a generation or so may be required before an understanding of the Gaia hypothesis leads to appropriate research" (Margulis and West 1997, p. 223).

reductionist, falsifiable, hypothesis writing, controls (thus removing bias as far as poss), empirical data, objectivity, paradigm (according to Popper)

Critical period hypothesis - Wikipedia

Each level is related as parts (below) to wholes (immediately above), with "micro-reductions" hypothesized to obtain between theories explaining phenomena at a lower and an immediately higher level. And while Oppenheim and Putnam admit that accomplished micro-reductions from levels 6 to 5 have not advanced very far, they cite individual choice theories in economics and the "principal theoretical approaches" in sociology (Marxist, Veblenian, Weberian, Mannheimian) as examples of attempted micro-reductions to individualist psychology.

the continuum hypothesis is undecidable in the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory as shown by Cohen.

It’s hard to believe that this is only my second post for the year

When discussing the status of bridge-principles (intuitively,statements that connect the vocabulary of the reducing theory to thereduced theory), Ernest Nagelsuggested that they might play different roles inthe discovery of reductions than in after the factanalyses. They may function as hypotheses to be tested, or they mayrely on empirical evidence already gathered. Similarly, KennethSchaffner suggests that an appropriate model of reduction should takeinto account not only logical or metaphysical aspects regarding thereduced and the reducing theory. Rather, it should also be sensitiveto pragmatic and epistemic aspects underlying the actions ofscientists who carry out reductions (Schaffner 1993: 515f.)—anidea he labels ‘logical pragmatism’. New Wavereductionists criticizedother models, especially Nagel's, for not being adequately sensitiveto how reductions are actually carried out, a point also made by Ager,Aronson, and Weingard (1974).