The Normativity of Meaning and Content
Normative Thesis Statement - Scanstrut
If e has meaning, the first disposition suffices todetermine which meaning it has. But e has meaning only if thesecond disposition is in place. Moreover, if both conditions arefulfilled, having the primitively normative attitude of taking the useone is disposed to make of e amounts to understanding thate means M.
Normative Thesis Definition: Alumni Writing Online
In the normativity debate the main focus has been on meaning: Thisis true of the Kripke discussion as well as of earlier discussionsconcerning the rulishness of language. However, parallel claims havealso been made about mental content and recently the thesis thatcontent is essentially normative has come into focus (McDowell &Pettit 1986, Brandom 1994, Engel 2000, Boghossian 2003, Gibbard 2003,Millar 2004, Jarvis 2012).
Thesis Normative Power Europe - legal-name …
In a paper entitled Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions, Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (who I will hereafter refer to as WNS) have proposed a challenge for the “normative project” (WNS 2001: 2) of epistemology, a project which involves taking an analytic perspective on epistemology and thereby setting norms for how to pursue knowledge.
PHD THESIS SUMMARY: Reconciling normative and …
Another question concerns the relation between thought (orintentional states in general) and language. On any account construingthought as dependent on language, as well as on any account construingthought and language as interdependent, and on any account according towhich mental content itself is determined by rules governing mentalexpressions, an intentional condition on rule guidance would inevitablylead guidance normativism back into vicious regress (cf. Boghossian1989a; 2008). For instance, if having an intentional state with acertain content is itself a matter of being guided by a contentdetermining rule, then another intentional state is required for havingthe first one, and so on ad infinitum. It has therefore been arguedthat according to Wittgenstein there must be a basic form of rulefollowing that is not subject to any intentional condition, but“blind” (Wright 2007). Alternatively, it has been arguedthat therefore the late Wittgenstein did not conceive of meaningful useof language as rule guided anymore (Glüer & Wikforss2010a).